Using a series of Pakistani tax reforms and administrative records, I document that taxable income responses induced by to-zero tax cuts are orders of magnitude larger than ones induced by similar-sized other cuts. This finding is remarkably robust to alternative specifications and holds for both self-employed and wage-earners. I explore salience, selective enforcement, and discontinuous evasion costs as explanations of the observed behavior. I find that the data favor the last explanation. The difference between the two sets of responses is primarily driven by large, discrete tax evasion response, which is included in the former but not in the latter behavior. I estimate the difference as a lower bound on tax evasion, showing that at least 70% of income of low-and middle-income self-employed and and 1% of low-income wage-earners goes unreported.
I Introduction
Important policy questions such as how high the tax rate can be and how wide the tax base needs to be depend critically upon how agents react to tax changes (Feldstein, 1999; Saez, 2004) . A rich body of literature leverages changes in the income tax schedule to estimate these reactions (Saez et al., 2012) . The changes exploited in this literature, however, are exclusively of the type where the tax rate moves within the positive region. A common feature of income tax systems around the world is that incomes below a given cutoff are not taxed. Upward revisions of the exemption cutoff create tax reforms where the rate moves from a positive value to zero. A priori, agents may not react to these to-zero reforms the same way they do to others. Tax evasion offers no tangible benefit when the rate is zero. To-zero reforms may be more salient than others. And the authorities may audit zero-rated incomes lightly. If behavior differs substantially across to-zero and not-tozero reforms, it would have important policy implications. Yet, there is little work in the existing literature that examines the question either theoretically or empirically.
In this paper, I exploit a series of sharp changes in the Pakistani income tax system to study this question. Pakistan has two income tax schedules, one for the self-employed and one for wage earners. The schedules are not indexed to inflation, and bracket boundaries, in particular the exemption cutoff, need to be moved every few years to avoid bracket creep. During the period considered in this paper (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , 1 the schedule for self-employed was revised once, in 2010; but the exemption cutoff was moved twice, in 2010 and 2011. Similarly, the wage-earners' schedule was revised once, in 2008; but the exemption cutoff was moved four times, in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 . These movements create plausibly exogenous to-zero and not-to-zero rate changes, which are particularly suited to the requirements of this paper both because they are similar-sized and because they are applied to a similar area of the income distribution.
I use data from the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) that comprise the universe of income tax returns filed between 2006 and 2011. Using the data, I present nonparametric evidence establishing 1 Pakistani tax year runs from July to June. A year t in this paper refers to the tax year from July t to June t + 1. Finkelstein, 2009; Taubinsky & Rees-Jones, 2017 ). This salience-based explanation can reconcile the observed behavior, meaning that the to-zero responses reflect true and not-to-zero responses attenuated behavior so that the difference between the two represents optimization errors. The evidence, however, does not support this explanation. The to-zero responses are too large to be taken as true responses to a typical tax change and the not-to-zero responses are comparable to salience-adjusted, structural responses estimated for the same set of taxpayers using other source of variation (Kleven & Waseem, 2013) .
The final explanation I consider is that the enforcement function may not be neutral across incomes in various brackets. It, for example, may treat zero-rated incomes favorably considering that no tax is payable. But this mechanism is completely absent in the Pakistani setting. The Pakistani tax administration audits around 2-5% of tax returns annually. These returns are selected at random through a publicly held ballot. The audit and enforcement functions in my empirical setting are therefore independent of income brackets or any other taxpayer trait and cannot explain the observed responses.
Having concluded that the empirical evidence favors the evasion-costs based explanation, I
proceed to show that the large difference observed between the observed to-zero and not-to-zero responses identifies a lower bound on tax evasion. The intuition for this result is simple. At a zero tax rate, it is optimal for a taxpayer to report her true income, as evasion offers no pecuniary benefit but still entails costs. As the rate increases marginally above zero, evading the component of income that entails trivial evasion cost becomes optimal. Reported income thus jumps as the rate moves to or away from zero. Because this jump represents the component of income that will not be reported at any positive tax rate, it identifies a lower bound on tax evasion. Comparing the to-zero and not-to-zero responses, I estimate this lower bound to be 70% for self-employment income and 1% for wage income, meaning that at least 70% of reported self-employment and 1% of reported wage income is evaded by zero-rated taxpayers in Pakistan. In the most parsimonious formulation of the model, these lower bounds reflect actual evasion rates tightly. But in richer settings the baseline result-true incomes are reported at the zero tax rate-may not hold and the lower bounds may not be tight. I explore three such settings: (1) possibility of downward revision of the exemption cutoff; (2) cross-checks in other tax bases; and (3) threat of future audits. In each case, the evidence suggests that incorporating the richer element of behavior is unlikely to take us too far away from the baseline results.
It is important to emphasize that this tight lower-bound interpretation is primarily relevant to the Pakistani setting only. In order to recover the level of evasion by comparing to-zero and notto-zero responses, it is crucial that both actual and perceived enforcement functions do not change discontinuously at the point the tax rate rises from zero to a positive value. This requirement, as shown above, is satisfied in the Pakistani setting but may not be satisfied in other settings for one or more of the reasons mentioned above. 2 One other factor limiting the generalizability of the result is that while the exemption cutoff in most of the developing countries-similar to Pakistan-is located high up in the income distribution (near the 80th percentile), it is located quite low in rich countries (below the 20th percentile). In both these cases (discontinuous enforcement function and low exemption cutoff), the difference between to-zero and not-to-zero responses would continue to recover a lower bound on tax evasion, but this lower bound would not be informative on the actual evasion level in the economy.
This paper contributes to a growing literature that uses quasi-experimental variation created by tax reforms to estimate behavioral responses to taxation (see Saez et al., 2012 for a survey). In particular, it adds to a recent strand of this literature that uses administrative microdata to study tax compliance in low-enforcement-capacity environments, emphasizing the role of information in compliance (see for example Pomeranz, 2015; Best et al., 2015; Naritomi, 2018; Carrillo et al., 2017; Waseem, 2018a,b) . Non-incremental, sizable to-zero reforms are frequent in both rich and developing countries, 3 and their policy implications are potential serious. Yet, there is very little 2 Indeed, there is some evidence from another developing country context that taxpayers are worried about reporting true income even when facing a zero tax rate due both to changes in the audit function and to dynamic enforcement considerations (see Tourek, 2019 work in the existing literature that examines the distinction between to-zero and not-to-zero reforms either theoretically or empirically. 4 This paper fills the gap, documenting how behavior differs substantially depending upon whether the taxpayer faces a zero or positive tax rate.
II Context, Data and Research Design
This section describes important features of the Pakistani income tax system and the research design I use for the empirical analysis.
II.A Context
Like other developing countries, personal income tax is an important and growing source of revenue for Pakistan. Its share in federal tax receipts has been rising steadily in recent years, accounting for roughly 13% of the receipts in 2013 (FBR, 2014) . The tax is collected through two distinct schedules, one each for the self-employed and wage earners. A taxpayer is classified as self-employed (wage earner) if her wage income does not exceed (exceeds) 50% of the taxable income and is then taxed according to the assigned schedule on the entire taxable income. The two schedules, shown in Figure A .I, specify average tax rate as a function of taxable income. The Pakistani tax system is quite simple. To calculate tax liability, a taxpayer simply multiplies her taxable income with the rate applicable in the corresponding bracket. The schedules are individual-based, there is no universal deduction other than that earnings below the exemption cutoff are not taxed, itemized deductions such as charitable donations are applied only after the tax liability has been calculated, and there is no system of tax credits or transfers interacting with the schedules. 5 The most important feature of the tax system from the perspective of this paper, however, is that the two schedules are not indexed to inflation and need revision every few years to avoid bracket 4 Besides this paper, one other works that I am aware of which examines taxpayer behavior at a zero tax rate is Tourek (2019).
5 Pakistan has a small, means-tested income transfer program targeted to extremely poor households. Given, however, that the income tax exemption cutoff is set around the 80th percentile of the income distribution, the sets of taxpayers and transfer recipients do not overlap.
creep. 6 During the period considered in this study (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , the schedule for self-employed was comprehensively revised once, in 2010; but the exemption cutoff was moved twice, in 2010 and 2011. Similarly, the wage-earners' schedule was comprehensively revised once, in 2008; but the exemption cutoff was moved four times, in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. 7 These reforms create plausibly exogenous tax variation, which for at least two reasons is particularly suited to the requirements of this paper. First, the to-zero and not-to-zero rate changes resulting from the reforms, illustrated in Figure I , are almost of the same size and are applied roughly to a similar area of the income distribution. 8 Second, as the main motivation behind these reforms was to avoid bracket creep, they are essentially narrow in focus and do not make significant changes to the tax code other than adjusting the bracket boundaries.
One additional advantage of the Pakistani context is that earnings reported at zero tax rate are also observed. Two provisions in the tax code make it possible. First, a provision introduced in 2009 mandates all registered taxpayers to file a return even if no tax is payable. Before 2009, another provision in the code required taxpayers to file for period t if income in any of the two previous periods, t − 1 and t − 2, was above the exemption cutoff. Table A .I assesses compliance with these filing requirements (also see Figure A .II for a nonparametric counterpart of this exercise.). I regress an indicator that a tax filer in period t also files in period t + 1 on a dummy indicating if the tax filer experiences a to-zero rate change. The regression is run separately for self-employed and wage-earners, and I also report results from placebo regressions where the rate changes are predated by one year. Overall, around 80% of the self-employed continue to file in the next period, but more importantly this probability does not drop for tax filers whose rate gets reduced to zero. In fact, the placebo exercise shows that such taxpayers are slightly more likely to file a 6 Inflation is generally high in Pakistan and hovered around 10% during the periods considered in this study 2006-11. 7 All these movements were in the upward direction. In fact, the exemption cutoff has never been revised downward in the history of the country. This creates strong, legitimate expectation that once reduced to zero the tax rate would not be raised back to the positive territory.
8 For example, the 2008 not-to-zero change and 2011 to-zero change for wage earners are exactly similar other than that the latter reduces the rate to zero whereas the former does not.
return. This should not be surprising as filing is an easily-verifiable discrete variable, and most tax administrations including the FBR use automated processes to identify and penalize nonfiling.
The Pakistani income tax system is based on the principle of self assessment. Returns filed in a tax year are considered final unless they are selected for audit. Audit therefore is the only mechanism through which compliance can be secured. The FBR, like their counterparts in other countries, have limited resources for audit, which means they can audit only a small fraction of returns filed every year. 9 The Pakistani tax code provides that the selection of returns for audit can only be based on objective criteria. Over the years, the superior courts of the country have narrowed down the definition of objective considerably. In fact, the FBR have been finding it difficult to defend any parametric selection criterion as objective. To avoid further litigation on the issue, they have adopted the practice of selecting audit cases randomly through a computer ballot.
These ballots are carried out publicly, and the results are displayed on the FBR website. The audit function faced by taxpayers in my sample is, therefore, quite sample: every tax filer faces a small (around 2-5%), exogenous probability of audit. The probability does not change discontinuously at the exemption cutoff, nor does it increase or decrease upon declaring income in the zero-rated region.
II.B Data
I use administrative data from the FBR that include income tax returns filed by the self-employed and wage earners in 2006-2011 and a set of taxpayer characteristics. The tax-return dataset contains variables corresponding to line items on the return form, including a brief profit and loss account, the decomposition of taxable income by source, and tax computations. The taxpayer characteristics dataset contains information captured at the time of registration such as the date of registration, gender, and location of a taxpayer. Appendix A.1 provides a detailed description of the variables used in the empirical analysis. All empirical results in this paper, unless otherwise specified, are based on the analysis sample with the following three categories of taxpayers dropped: (1) female taxpayers because the exemption cutoffs for them are slightly higher than male taxpayers in 2006-09, 11 (2) partners in partnership firms as their earnings are subject to a different tax regime (Waseem, 2018b) , (3) taxpayers who switch from self-employed to wage earner and vice versa from concerns that such switching may be endogenous to tax changes. 12 These taxpayers are only a small fraction of the 10 Of course, I do not impose any restriction on z it+1 . 11 Doing the analysis separately for the two genders is difficult because female taxpayers are less than 3% of the analysis sample (see row 11 of the table).
12 Table A .III assesses if the switching probability differs across years. Switching between the two bases is rare, and there are no meaningful differences in switching across years. I also investigate if switchers are concentrated disproportionately around the exemption cutoff. The regression of an indicator variable that a self-employed in period t becomes a wage-earner in period t + 1 on a dummy indicating that the taxpayer is located within 50k of the exemption threshold (300k) returns a coefficient of 0.0064 with a standard error of 0.0012. This coefficient is in fact smaller than the one I obtain from the placebo regression, which is run on the prereform periods only (when 300k
II.C Research Design
I use a simple difference-in-differences research design to estimate earnings responses generated by the to-zero and not-to-zero rate changes. The research design-based on the workhorse empirical model in the tax responsiveness literature (see for example Saez et al. 2012 )-leverages the fact that taxpayers in different brackets of the two tax schedules experience differential rate changes over time. It is particularly suited to the Pakistani setting as taxpayers in few brackets undergo no tax change at all and can therefore serve as a clean control group. I estimate the following model
where ∆log z k it is the log change in income of type k from period t to t + 1 for taxpayer i, treat i is a vector of two dummies [to-zero i not-to-zero i ] which turn on whenever the corresponding tax change is experienced, year t is a vector of year fixed effects, post t are dummies indicating the year in which the particular change takes place, and X it are a set of controls. Given that the identification here comes from the comparison of taxpayers in different areas of the income distribution, the major threat to identification is mean-reversion. I take three steps to rule out this and related concern. First, I provide nonparametric evidence showing that the earnings growth rate (∆log z k it ) remains remarkably uniform throughout the income distribution during the periods of no tax change. Second, I also estimate augmented specifications corresponding to (1) Table I responses. The corresponding estimates are always large, statistically significant, and remarkable robust to alternative specifications. Column (1) of the table, for example, shows that the reduction of the rate to zero causes a 27 log-points additional income growth in the treatment group in the first year after the reform. This is around 5 times larger than the prereform average of 5 log-points per year. Considering that the average net-of-tax rate change behind the response is only 1.7 log-points, the estimate translates into an enormous elasticity of greater than 15. Second, the similar-sized,
III.A.2 Regression-based Estimates
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology not-to-zero tax cut generates no response at all. The corresponding estimate is always of opposite sign, small, and statistically insignificant in all but one specification.
III.A.3 Robustness
Given the difference-in-differences research design, the key identification requirement in this setup is of parallel trends: reported earnings of the compared groups (tax brackets that experience and do not experience the tax rate changes) must have followed the same path in the absence of the rate changes. The nonparametric evidence in Figure II illustrates that this is indeed true. The earnings growth rate remains remarkably stable and uniform over time and across the income distribution during the periods of no-tax-change. Figure A .IV provides an aggregate counterpart to this result.
It shows that the average earnings growth was very similar in the prereform years for both groups but surged sharply in the treated group exactly at the time of the reform. In fact, the preexisting earnings trends were so flat and stable, that the time-series estimates, reported in Table A.V, are indistinguishable from the corresponding difference-in-differences estimates. Tables I and A.IV- A.V further confirm that the results are insensitive to (1) including additional control variables; (2) replacing year fixed effects with the parametric time trend; (3) adding a full set of year, industry, region, industry × year, and region×year fixed effects; and (4) keeping the composition of the estimation sample fixed. Table A .VI conducts an additional set of robustness checks. Column (2) drops taxpayers who bunch at the notches in the baseline tax schedule from concerns that their reported income might be affected by the strong, local incentives created by the notches or that these taxpayers might be special. Column (3) drops taxpayers around the income-composition notch, where the classification of a taxpayer switches from self-employed to wage-earner and vice versa. Columns (4)- (5) increase the range of the data from z it ∈ (80k 500k] in the baseline results to z it ∈ (0 500k] in column (4) and z it > 0 in column (5). Columns (6)-(9) add additional control variables into specification (1).
Reassuringly, the results from all these alternative specifications are very similar to the baseline results.
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Another common concern in the tax responsiveness studies is mean-reversion. I take two steps to alleviate this concern. First, I test if mean reversion is a significant problem in this setting by estimating equation (1) on the prereform periods only. Table A .VII shows the results. The coefficient on the two interaction dummies are extremely small and statistically indistinguishable from zero in all but one specification. This demonstrates that the relative difference in reported income from one year to the next does not change significantly across the treated and untreated groups for any nontax reason including mean-reversion. I complement this test with another strategy (see Table   A .VIII). I reestimate equation (1) after including the standard controls for mean-reversion i.e. log of base period income and a ten-piece spline of log base period income (Saez et al., 2012) . I obtain very similar results with and without these controls, reinforcing the conclusion that mean-reversion is not a significant concern in this setting. 13 Finally, I rule out one alternative explanation of the observed behavior. Suppose that agents do not like to pay taxes (or there are some fixed costs of actually making the payments), but they also do not like to cheat more than they have to. In this setting, agents would evade only up to the point of zero tax liability, reporting income just below the exemption cutoff. They would simply move to the new cutoff after a reform that increases the cutoff. This alternative model generates two testable predictions: bunching would be stronger at the exemption cutoff than a similar other notch, and it would shift to the new cutoff after the reform. Figure A .V tests the latter prediction. It compares the earnings growth rate needed to hit the new exemption cutoff with the actual earnings growth rate observed in the data. For example, earnings of a taxpayer bunching at the baseline exemption cutoff of PKR 100k have to increase by 200% if it, in accordance with this explanation, 13 In addition to these, a working paper version of this paper (?) carries out further robustness tests. These include, inter alia, reporting estimates from two variants of equation (1), where I use wage-earners with positive self-employment income as the control group. These alternative research designs compare the self-employment income of taxpayers classified as self-employed by the tax code with the self-employment income of taxpayers classified as wage-earners by the tax code, who do not undergo the tax rate changes in 2010-11. These research designs allow additional set of robustness checks, including built-in tests for the parallel trends assumption. The results from these double-and triple-difference specifications are strictly consistent with those in this version of the paper. plots the growth of wage income from period t to t + 1 as a function of the base period income I follow a simple strategy to obtain a first-pass evidence on the tax-induced behavior, regressing the log change in wage income from period t to t+1 on a full set of year fixed effects. The residuals from the regression are then regressed on four yearly dummies, one each for 2007 to 2010. These later regressions are run separately in the PKR 20k bins, and the estimated coefficients and 95%
confidence intervals are plotted in Panels C-F. Clearly, once a common year effect is partialled out, the residual income growth is homogeneous across years and over the income distribution. It, however, spikes in the areas of the distribution where the rate was brought to zero. Though this 14 In a working-paper version, Kleven & Waseem (2013) find that the elasticity implied by the bunching at the baseline exemption cutoff is 0.077. In comparison, the elasticity implied by the bunching at the next three notches is 0.097, 0.083, and 0.091 (please see Table 1 of May 2011 version of the paper). The exemption cutoff during these years was at PKR 100k and the next three notches were at PKR 110k, 125k and 150k. The notches were also of a similar size, involving a jump in average tax rate of 0.5 (for the first two) and 1 (for the others) percentage points. 15 00832 9
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spike is not as prominent as self-employment income's, the overall pattern is consistent with the earlier result that to-zero and not-to-zero reforms elicit substantially different behavior. The next section formalizes this analysis by presenting the regression-based estimates. Table II reports the results from equation (1). I begin with the baseline specification in column (1) and then successively add more control variables, permuting among the combinations of controls for mean-reversion-log base period income and a ten-piece spline of log base period income-and other controls in the rest of the columns. To test the adequacy of the mean-reversion controls, panel B reports the estimates from placebo regressions, where I pretend that all rate changes took place one year earlier than they actually did. Table A .IX runs additional robustness checks.
III.B.2 Regression-based Estimates
The main findings are the following. First, the to-zero coefficient is always economically meaningful, statistically significant, and considerably stable across specifications. Given that the rate changes underlying the response are extremely small (always less than one percent, Figure   IC -F), the estimate translates into a huge elasticity of more than three. This elasticity is orders of magnitude larger than the one, 0.04, estimated by Kleven & Waseem (2013) for wage earners in Pakistan. Second, despite the fact that the not-to-zero changes are on average twice the size of the to-zero changes, the earnings responses generated by them are statistically and economically insignificant. Third, the placebo coefficient corresponding to the to-zero estimate is always trivial and statistically insignificant in most of the specifications. This shows that mean-reversion is not much of a concern in this setting and that the base-period income controls are able to account for it adequately.
IV Why does behavior differ across to-zero and other tax cuts?
The above evidence convincingly shows that reported income responses produced by to-zero tax cuts differ substantially from those produced by not-to-zero tax cuts. In this section, I explore three 16 00832 9 
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IV.A Reverse-L Shaped Evasion Costs
The standard way to think about evasion costs is that they are expected fine and penalty payments which would be recovered in case the evasion is detected by the government (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Slemrod, 2001 ). Recent empirical evidence shows that the probability that evasion gets detected is quite high if reported income is covered by the third-party information the government obtains from sources such as employers and financial institutions and quite low otherwise when the tax rate is zero but would evade e as the rate increases marginally above zero, producing a discontinuous earnings supply function of the form shown in Figure IVB .
The discontinuity in the earnings supply function can explain the large, substantive difference observed between the two types of responses. The intuition for this result is provided in Figure   IVB , which considers the effects of two equal-sized rate cuts on income reported by the agent.
The response triggered by the to-zero cut ∆z A (τ A → 0) is considerably larger, as it consists of both the discrete change in tax evasion (movement along the horizontal axis) and the continuous 15 Throughout the paper, I maintain the assumption that the third-party reports the government receives are complete and not themselves distorted by evasion. Otherwise, they would not deter tax evasion as effectively (see for example Brockmeyer & Hernandez, 2017) . change in reported income (movement along the supply curve). By contrast, the response induced by the not-to-zero tax cut ∆z B (τ B → τ B ) is smaller, as it consists of the latter component only.
The model thus fits the observed pattern of response quite well. To probe this point further, I take the other two predictions of the model to the data.
If the difference between the two sets of response reflects evasion costs then it must be that the to-zero response largely arises from a changes in tax evasion and not effort. Figure A .VII tests this prediction of the model. I look at how individual line items on the tax return form react to the two types of rate cuts. The idea behind the exercise is to see which factor-adjustments in tax evasion or effort-drives the larger response to the to-zero tax cuts. The six items considered here form the profit and loss account of a taxpayer, and while all of them are expected to increase with effort, some can be misreported easily than others. My focus here is to identify any differential response between the easy-and hard-to-misreport items. Each panel of the figure plots the mean log change in the line item from period t to t + 1 as a function of the self-employment income in period t. Since the sets of taxpayers in various bins here are the same as in Figure IIA , the analysis should be seen as the decomposition of the response depicted there. Figures A.VIII and A.IX formalize this analysis, showing the difference-in-differences version of these plots. Clearly, the line items do not respond uniformly: annual sales and costs respond aggressively, profit and loss expenses (in part third-party-reported and therefore harder to misreport) respond moderately, 16 and imports do not respond at all. Of all the items, imports is perhaps the hardest to misreport because such misreporting can easily be detected through the Customs and Excise records. Its nonresponsiveness, therefore, provides the cleanest evidence that the large jump in reported earnings is driven by a drop in tax evasion. Panels E-F strengthen this conclusion. A surge in real activity triggered by an unanticipated decrease in taxes is likely to result in the running down of inventory.
Contrary to this, inventories at the end of 2010 and 2011 rise sharply. 17 Thus overall behavior of 16 Profit and loss expenses are input costs such as wages, rents, accounting and legal fees, electricity, and interest paid on loans. Although these costs can be over-reported, it is difficult to do so considering that these can potentially be verified at the time of audit. 17 The Pakistani tax cuts of 2010 were announced on June 6, 2010 but took effect from the beginning of the new financial year i.e. July 1, 2010. This gave taxpayers a window of around 00832 9
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line items is consistent with a tax evasion explanation of the observed behavior. Had the growth of self-employment income been a result of an increase in effort, all line items would have responded uniformly. Instead, easy-to-misreport items respond more aggressively than others.
The third prediction of the model is that tax evasion would be high even at a very low tax rate.
This prediction simply reflects that the cost of evading income up to e is quite low and therefore not reporting this component of income becomes optimal even at a very low tax rate (this can be seen from Figure IV) . The evidence presented above is consistent with this prediction of the model as well. Specifically, Figure IIA shows that the reported earnings of taxpayers with baseline income in the range (100k, 110k] on average rise by around 70% as their tax rate reduces from 0.5% to 0%. This demonstrates that consistent with the structure in the model a large component of tax evasion is fixed in nature: around 70% of reported income is evaded even when the tax rate is as low as 0.5%.
IV.B Salience
There is growing evidence in literature that agents do not optimize fully to taxes. Tax schedules are complex, many decision-relevant attributes of taxes are shrouded, and attention is a depletable resource. Together, this implies that agents may not pay full attention to less-salient taxes, under- 
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response by ∆z, this statement can be translated into two testable conditionŝ
True responses of both types are nearly equal, 18 but the observed not-to-zero response is attenuated by a factor θ ∈ [0, 1]. In the extreme case, agents completely ignore a not-to-zero rate change θ = 0 so that the difference between the two captures optimization error only. income in the range 400-500k, it is estimated to be 0.06, a response not different from the one observed here. Both conditions in (2) therefore lack empirical support, suggesting that salience is not the first-order mechanism driving the large difference between the two behaviors. I establish this further in section V of the paper, where I show that the difference remains unchanged even if the not-to-zero response is corrected of the salience bias by assuming an extreme value of the attenuation factor θ, such as 0.1. 18 Note that I assume throughout this section that both types of rate changes are roughly equal in magnitude and are applied to very similar taxpayers. 20 00832 9
IV.C Enforcement Environment
If the audit function has a discontinuity at the exemption cutoff, it may make an agent's decision of how much to report contingent upon the tax rate (zero or positive). We have seen in section II.A that it is not the case in Pakistan. The audit probability faced by a tax filer in the country is independent of the tax rate, income, or any other characteristic. But even more generally, a discontinuity in the audit function at the exemption cutoff is unlikely in the Pakistani setting. Figure In an optimal plan, a revenue-maximizing tax authority would allocate audit resources towards cases where the enforcement action is likely to be most productive. This means that among similar taxpayers ones evading the most would be targeted. This rule is unlikely to generate discontinuous enforcement given that there is no difference in amount evaded on both sides of the cutoff.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology segment; column (2) to the earnings response produced by the to-zero change; column (3) to the earnings response produced by the equal-sized not-to-zero change; column (4) to the difference between the two responses; and column (5) to the average evasion rate in the segment.
To compute the estimates in column (2), I follow three steps. I first replace the two to-zero × post dummies in equation (1) multiply the estimate from the second step with the average income in the segment to convert it into rupees. The estimates in column (3) are computed using the taxable income elasticities reported in Kleven & Waseem (2013) . 20 Using these elasticities instead of the not-to-zero estimates in Table I is preferable for two reasons. Table III assuming an extreme 20 In computing the estimates for column (3), I keep the magnitude of the tax rate change the same as for column (2). More specific, for a segment k I convert the elasticity ε k into earnings response ∆z k using the formula ∆z k = ε k .z k .∆(1 − τ k ), wherez k is average income in the segment, and∆(1 − τ k ) is the proportional net-of-tax rate change experienced by taxpayers in the segment because of the reform.
21 Kleven & Waseem (2013) use notches in the baseline Pakistani tax system (2006-2009) to identify these elasticities. These notches were in the same area of the income distribution where the 2010 and 2011 to-zero reforms were applied. Column (2) and (3) thus compare how very similar taxpayers react to equal-sized to-zero and a not-to-zero rate changes. Tables   III and A .X). This should not be surprising given that the large difference between the to-zero and not-to-zero responses documented here reflects not that the latter responses are too small but rather that the former responses are too large.
Two features of the results need emphasizing. First, tax evasion is large even at very low rates, such as 0.5% at the bottom. This behavior, as I note above, is consistent with the predictions of the model, illustrating that evasion jumps to e 0 whenever the rate increases marginally above zero. Second, the evasion rate is roughly constant up to the income of PKR 150k and then declines cutoff where evasion does not approach zero even when the rate drops to zero. This interval is larger if taxpayers have dynamic considerations so that they try to keep not only their current but also future income below the cutoff. A monotonically declining response, therefore, arises naturally in this model and means that the unconstrained evasion rate is observed only at the bottom where taxpayers are too far away from the new cutoff to be influenced by it. On the basis of this consideration, I conclude that the lower-bound on the evasion rate of zero-rated self-employed, as implied by the first four rows of the table, is around 70%. Table II shows that wage income also behaves according to the predictions of the discontinuous evasion costs based model. Of course, its response is much smaller than the self-employment income's because it is third-party reported. But to the extent that formula (15) holds for wage income as well, the difference between the to-zero and not-to-zero responses identifies the lower bound on the evasion of wage income. The extent of such evasion, however, is small at around 1% 23 00832 9 
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V.A Applicability
The Pakistani to-zero reforms bite deep into the self-employment income distribution. Figure A .X shows this formally by superimposing the baseline CDF of self-employment income on Figure IIF .
The exercise shows that the minimum evasion rate I report in the above section applies to more than 50% of the population of self-employed tax filers (Panel A). Note, however, that although broadly applicable, this estimate is essentially local in nature. To claim global applicability, I need to assume that the evasion technology available to top-income taxpayers is the same as the one available to low-and middle-income taxpayers. Or in other words top-income taxpayers face the same evasion costs as do low-and middle-income taxpayers. It is, however, a strong assumption 22 and the one I cannot test, as the to-zero reforms do not extend farther to the right of the distribution.
The estimates in Table III 
V.B Heterogeneity
To explore heterogeneity in the self-employed evasion rate, I estimate the following triple-difference version of equation (1) ∆log z
22 High-income taxpayers may have access to more sophisticated methods of evasion (they can hire accountants, move income offshore). On the other hand, they may also be subject to stricter enforcement (higher proportion of digital/third-party-reported transactions). Thus a priori it is not clear if the evasion rate amongst them would be higher or lower than the low-and middle-income taxpayers. (Table A. XII), and young taxpayers vs. old taxpayers (Table A .XIII). The evidence thus suggests that within the population of self-employed there is little variation in the the extent of evasion.
V.C How tight is the lower bound?
In the baseline model, taxpayers report their true income as the tax rate approaches zero: evasion offers no benefit at the zero rate but entails a strictly positive cost. Although quite intuitive, the assumption might not be satisfied in richer settings. In this section, I take up three such settings, examining in each case if the extension can cause a significant departure from the baseline result. Table A .XII for the evidence). That the possibility of cross-verification across multiple bases does not worry taxpayers too much should not be surprising, as the evidence from other contexts also shows that when taxpayers report a higher base in one tax, they can leave the base reported in an overlapping tax unchanged by adjusting along some other margin (see for example Carrillo et al., 2017; Waseem, 2018b Threat of future audits.-Taxpayers may not report their true income even at a zero tax rate if they fear that it would make them more likely to face an audit or that it would be used against them in future audits. Note, however, that the first of these two considerations is entirely absent in the Pakistani setting. As explained in section II.A, the probability of audit faced by Pakistani tax filers is small and exogenous. The probability does not increase or decrease with a change in reported income. On the second of these considerations, note that the ability of an audit to assess the legitimacy of a change in the reported income categorized e in this paper is limited.
The earning or consumption of this component of income leaves no verifiable information trail, making it extremely difficult for an auditor to claim, much less prove, that the change in income is not legitimate.
The above discussion shows that none of the above three extension is likely to push us too far away from the baseline setting. The lower bounds reported in Table III therefore must be close to the actual evasion rate of these taxpayers. One argument reinforcing the conclusion is that any disadvantage of revealing true income, even if it exists, must diminish as we move left within the zero-rated region. It is because all the forces mentioned above, and similar other forces, must decline as we move toward the lower end of the distribution. 24 Empirical evidence is consistent with this argument. As we move left of the new exemption cutoff, the to-zero responses initially grow stronger. They reach their peak at PKR 150k and remain static thereafter (see Figure II) .
This pattern provides perhaps the strongest evidence that the responses of taxpayers with baseline income up to PKR 150k are free from the above considerations and therefore capture the amount evaded by these taxpayers reasonably. 24 Taxpayers at the lower end of the distribution become increasingly less likely to (i) face a positive tax rate in future (the first point here); (ii) be registered for other taxes (the second point here); or (iii) face a heightened risk of audit (the third and fourth point here). 
VI Conclusion
I leverage a series of sharp changes in the Pakistani income tax schedule to document that behavioral responses induced by to-zero tax reforms-reforms that move the rate to or away from zero-are orders of magnitude larger than those induced by others. This result is remarkably robust across specifications and is true for both self-employed and wage-earners, although as expected the responses of wage-earners are much smaller. I explore three explanations of the observed behavior.
It can be argued that taxpayers pay full attention when the rate reduces to zero but not otherwise.
While a salience-based model can explain the weak and insignificant not-to-zero responses, it cannot explain the large to-zero responses documented in this paper (taxable income elasticity as large as 60). I also reject discontinuous enforcement-zero-rated incomes receive lighter enforcement-as an explanation of the result. The likelihood of audit faced by Pakistani income tax filers is small and independent of the tax rate they face or any other of their trait. I conclude that the divergence in behavior is driven primarily by tax evasion. The costs of not reporting some categories of income are small and of others large. Income entailing little evasion cost is reported at the zero rate but not otherwise. On the other hand, income entailing large evasion cost is always reported. Responses to to-zero tax reforms are larger because they include both categories of reported income. In the evasion cost based model, the difference between the to-zero and not-to-zero responses provides a lower bound on tax evasion. Exploiting the Pakistani tax reforms, I estimate that at least 70% of self-employment and 1% of wage income is not reported by the low-and middle-income taxpayers of the country.
The reporting behavior I uncover has important policy implications. First, the elasticity of taxable income is an important parameter for key tax policy choices such as setting the optimal tax rates. The existing literature estimates this elasticity from not-to-zero reforms only. I show that the most important reaction to taxes takes place as the rate moves from zero to a small, positive value. Ignoring this can result in suboptimal policy choices. For example, the shape of the optimal income tax schedule-especially at the bottom of the income distribution-that takes these reactions into account would be substantially different from the one that does not. Second, I find 28 00832 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that a substantial proportion of taxable income goes unreported. This suggests that the return from investment in the enforcement capacity could be large (Besley & Persson, 2013) . Research shows that altering the tax mix (Best et al., 2015) , redesigning the incentives of tax collectors (Khan et al., 2016) , promoting documentation (Naritomi, 2018), strengthening traditional enforcement methods (Almunia & Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018; Waseem, 2018a) , and priming social and psychological factors (Slemrod et al., 2018) can promote tax compliance. Exploiting such measures is even more desirable in developing economies where the third-party information-which drives tax compliance in rich countries-is limited in both its scope and effectiveness (Jensen 2019; Carrillo et al. 2017; Waseem 2018a) . Third, I show that tax evasion lowers the effective tax rate faced by the low-and middle-income self-employed to one-half the statutory rate. This creates significant horizontal equity concerns across self-employed and wage-earners, which need to be addressed to build trust in the tax system and to avoid misallocation of physical and human capital. Notes: Panel A of the figure illustrates the evasion cost function (7). The agent can evade e units of income on paying a small fixed cost of g. The costs turn sharply at the cutoff e from where the third-party reported units of income begin. Panel B displays the earnings supply function (12), illustrating how an optimizing taxpayer facing such evasion costs would behave at various tax rates: the taxpayer would report true income wl 0 at the zero rate but discretely lower income wl 0 − e at a rate marginally above zero. The discontinuity means that the difference between the taxable income response to a to-zero reform ∆z A (τ A → 0) and a not-to-zero reform ∆z B (τ B → τ B ) identifies e. Intuitively, any smooth change in reported income caused by a change in rate (movement along the curve) is netted out, leaving behind the discrete change in income from wl 0 − e to wl 0 (movement along the horizontal axis). 
